Key points
- Latest Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) guidance confirms creation of share security will not trigger change of control tests unless it is title transfer security.
- Rights to exercise voting rights to secured shares following a loan default need to be drafted with care to keep lenders within the carve-outs available for preserving the value of, or enforcing, their security.
- Enforcing security over shares or assets where a national security risk exists, will trigger notification that will inevitably delay the process.
- Lenders need to be alive to the need for careful due diligence when funding acquisitions of entities or assets where call-in powers may arise.
In this article (first published in the Journal of International Banking and Financial Law 2022 Volume 37, Issue 9), Rebecca Oliver considers how the further market guidance published in July 2022 by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) – which includes commentary on the application of the National Security and Investment Act 2021 (NSIA) to security arrangements – helps secured lenders. The article considers where lenders still need to be wary of the NSIA implications and suggests how lenders and their advisers might limit NSIA risk in lending structures.
The National Security and Investment Act 2021
The National Security and Investment Act 2021 (NSIA) came into force on 4 January 2022 giving the government broader powers to assess and intervene in investments and other acquisitions of control that may give rise to national security risks. The NSIA significantly expanded the types of transactions covered by national security reviews to include acquisitions of voting rights and assets including land and intellectual property. Failure to comply may result in heavy sanctions including turnover-based fines and criminal liability, as well as the risk of transactions subject to mandatory notification being void. As outlined in previous articles in this publication, there have been considerable concerns as to the impact of the NSIA on the taking of, and enforcement of, security over entities and assets within the remit of the Act, and in particular, the extent to which the transfer of voting rights in connection with share security supporting corporate lending may trigger notification obligations. In July, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) published further market guidance including commentary on the application of the NSIA to security arrangements and this article considers how the guidance helps secured lenders, where lenders still need to be wary of the NSIA implications and suggests how lenders and their advisers might limit NSIA risk in lending structures.
As noted in earlier articles, where acquisitions of entities or assets posing a potential national security risk are being funded, lenders must consider voluntary notification as part of the due diligence process to avoid the risk of later exercise of call-in powers that could undermine the acquisition, as well as result in penalties for buyer side parties. Similarly, lenders will be aware that enforcing security over businesses in risk areas, will require further clearances for sales to third parties. Outside of direct acquisition funding, share security has been the greatest area of uncertainty for secured creditors with stakeholders questioning whether notifications are triggered when:
- Security is created given the reference in the NSIA to holding an “interest” which would not only extend to legal title transferred to a mortgagee but could conceivably also include the equitable rights of holders of share charges;
- Voting rights are transferred to secured lenders on certain default events under the associated lending; or
- Security is enforced and shares are transferred to a potential purchaser, or to a nominee of the security holder pending a purchaser being found.
It has generally been the accepted view in the market that mere creation of share security would not of itself trigger notification requirements unless the security was created by title transfer. This view has been confirmed in the July guidance from BEIS:
"The granting of types of share security where title to the shares is not transferred to the secured lender (or its nominee) is not a notifiable acquisition requiring mandatory notification, even if it involves an entity carrying on activities covered in the Notifiable Acquisition Regulations. "
So, whilst legal mortgages of shares where lenders become registered owners of the shares, or in Scots law security arrangements similarly involving title transfer, will trigger notification prior to their creation, equitable mortgages and charges will not. Legal mortgages of shares in English companies are not the norm and the guidance notes that whilst non-title transfer security undoubtedly conveys rights to the secured party, it does not constitute an increase in shareholding or voting rights at the point of creation. This is welcome news for English lawyers at least and thanks go to the City of London Law Society and other stakeholders for pursuing this area of uncertainty. The guidance makes it clear though that if legal title or control is passed in relation to shares falling within the Notifiable Acquisition Regulations, then notification before completion is required, so title transfer security is intended to be notifiable in cases of national security risk.
In addition, where security over shares leads to the transfer of voting rights following a default event, or where shares are sold on enforcement of the security, notifications may be required. This is a logical conclusion given the mischief of the NSIA is to enable transparency and review of those with control over national security risk entities and assets prior to their acquisition.
So, what steps can lenders take to avoid these potential pitfalls?
Due Diligence
Lenders need to understand whether entities and assets they are financing have the potential now, or in the future, to be operating in areas of national security concern. Although it is the acquiror at risk of penalty, lenders will not want to fund acquisitions potentially falling within the scope of the NSIA that have not been notified and cleared in advance to avoid the risk of their later being called-in and set aside, therefore detailed due diligence is of equal importance to the lenders as it is to the buyer. Ultimately, the board of directors should have the best knowledge and understanding of what a business is doing, or plans to do, and whilst board resolutions that an acquisition is not within the realms of the NSIA will not influence whether BEIS takes a different view, documenting their considerations as a board will focus their attention and help to flush out any concerns at an early stage. Where lenders identify a risk of falling within the NSIA, either the acquisition agreements, or the funding agreements, or both, will need to be conditional on notification and clearance, and the time to complete this process factored into the closing timetable.
Control over future acquisitions
In leveraged lending it is common to restrict future acquisitions without lender consent, but similar restrictions should be considered for any borrower group where acquisitions of entities or assets, might fall within the ambit of the NSIA.
Lenders need to take care in taking and exercising voting rights in the context of holding share security
Section 8(5) of the NSIA relates to an increase in voting rights and the July guidance notes that where lenders are entitled to exercise voting rights, a notifiable event does not occur until the trigger event providing control happens. It is rare for lenders to hold voting rights under share security arrangements unless and until a default event occurs under the associated loan, and that is because lenders do not generally want the administrative burden of voting the shares. Default events in loan arrangements enable lenders to exert some control over how a borrower group will operate whilst loans are outstanding in order to limit the risk of businesses being badly managed. They entitle lenders to demand early repayment in circumstances where credit risk deteriorates. Although lenders often do not exercise those rights to demand early repayment, they need those rights to accelerate debt repayment in order to enforce their security and discharge the debt. Where share security is held, lenders may want to exercise voting rights to protect the value of the share security. For example, if the nature of the default gives lenders cause for concern as to how the company is being managed, voting the shares would enable a change of directors, or an appointment of an administrator. Equally there may be factual circumstances where lenders want to exercise voting rights to veto certain shareholder decisions.
The NSIA does provide a carve out for this sort of lender action in para 7 of Sch 1 which states:
"Rights attached to shares held by way of security provided by a person are to be treated as held by that person -
(a) where apart from the right to exercise them for the purpose of preserving the value of the security, or of realising it, the rights are exercisable only in accordance with that person’s instructions, and
(b) where the shares are held in connection with the granting of loans as part of normal business activities and apart from the right to exercise them for the purpose of preserving the value of the security, or of realising it, the rights are exercisable only in that person’s interests.”
It will be important though, that lenders consider carefully: (i) when their voting rights arise; and (ii) how they exercise voting rights, to stay within the parameters of the para 7 carve-out.
If the lenders’ rights are not expressed to be limited in this way in the share security documents, and they arise automatically on the occurrence of a default, then there is concern that notification will be impossible before that automatic increase in voting rights. Possible drafting options to avoid this situation would be:
(i) limit the voting rights of the lender to only being exercisable on the terms permitted by the para 7 carve-out – then if they arise automatically following a default, it does not matter; or
(ii) do not grant lenders voting rights automatically following a default, but only where they give notice that they want to exercise voting rights – this gives lenders the time to notify under the NSIA and seek clearance where they consider it necessary; or
(iii) suspend voting rights of lenders unless they have any necessary NSIA clearance.
The Loan Market Association real estate finance security documents have adopted method (iii) in drafting changes made in their template in June:
"The Security Agent shall not be entitled to exercise any voting rights or any other powers or rights […] if and to the extent that:
(i) a notifiable acquisition would, as a consequence, take place under section 6 of the National Security and Investment Act 2021 (the NSI Act) and any regulations made under the NSI Act; and
(ii) either:
(A) the Secretary of State has not approved that notifiable acquisition in accordance with the NSI Act; or
(B) the Secretary of State has approved that notifiable acquisition in accordance with the NSI Act but there would, as a consequence, be a breach of the provisions of a final order made in relation to that notifiable acquisition under the NSI Act."
Any of the suggested drafting methods will work to ensure there is no automatic accidental NSIA notification requirement triggered by a default simply occurring. It is the author’s suggestion that drafting method (ii) gives the lender the most discretion to exercise voting rights in a way in which they need to in the given circumstances, and to decide whether a notifiable transfer of control will occur or not by exercising those rights. It is also drafting that works for other similar legislative purposes – for example, to avoid association or connection which may give rise to liability for pensions liabilities under the moral hazard powers of the Pensions Regulator, and in fact many existing security arrangements may already be drafted in this way for that very reason. Where borrower groups are distressed, it is vital for secured lenders to be able to act quickly and with confidence on the basis of advice they receive at the time in the given circumstances with clarity of their rights to act. It is worth remembering that the review powers under the NSIA are not limited to English incorporated entities, but extend to overseas companies connected with activities carried on, or the supply of goods or services, in the UK, so it is not just the terms of English law share security under review.
Consider enforcement methods: is administration an option?
The NSIA does allow administrators
or creditors of a company in insolvency
proceedings to exercise rights without
triggering a change of control review,
whereas the appointment of a liquidator or
receiver does not receive the same carveout.
This division of insolvency processes is
perhaps justifiable where an administrator’s
role is to manage an ongoing period of
trading whilst attempting an agreement
with key creditors to facilitate a longer-term
rescue plan and a handing back of control
to the existing management. However,
a considerable proportion of administrations
result in a sale of part of a business as
a going concern, and that subsequent
sale whilst an administrator is at the
helm, would, if in the NSIA notification
sectors, still require review and clearance.
A liquidator in contrast is not managing
ongoing trading, there is no expected
rescue, their task is to collect and sell assets
on a piecemeal basis for the benefit of all
creditors. However, whilst it is obvious why
a subsequent sale may warrant review, it is
not immediately obvious how a review at
the stage of appointment of a liquidator,
at a time when there is no particular
purchaser for relevant assets in mind, is
helpful. The same applies in relation to a
receiver appointed to sell particular assets
to derive value for the secured creditor – at
the time they are appointed, there is not
usually a known purchaser waiting in the
wings, so how useful can a review at that
point be? Time is of the essence for secured
creditors seeking to enforce security, as
the value of the secured assets plummets
as news of insolvency breaks, and reviews
before willing buyers can be found will
inevitably make security enforcement
more onerous. The more subtle intention
of the difference in treatment may be to
encourage administration processes with
seamless ongoing operation of entities in the
mandatory notification sectors for public
policy reasons to enable potential purchasers
to be reviewed without a pause in operations
and trading. But ongoing trade requires
funding, and administration is not always
possible or justifiable.
What next?
Over time, as the government publishes
final orders made under the NSIA, a clearer
picture should emerge for secured lenders.
In the meantime, it may make it harder, and
more expensive, for businesses operating in
risk sectors to raise funding.
Further reading
- Legal Ease with Lexis PSL (2022) 4 JIBFL 290.
- The National Security and Investment Act 2021 revisited: when are secured creditors obliged to make mandatory notifications? (2022) 4 JIBFL 239.
- Calling it in: the implications of the new National Security and Investment Act 2021 on financing transactions (2021) 9 JIBFL 616.
- Don’t forget about the NSIA: potential implications for securitisations (2022) 6 JIBFL 418.