Publication
2025 Annual Litigation Trends Survey
Norton Rose Fulbright has released its 2025 Annual Litigation Trends Survey, analyzing litigation trends across the legal landscape.
Australia | Publication | April 2022
This article was co-authored with Shaun Buckton.
Class closure orders can facilitate settlement of class actions by defining the population of participating group members and enabling their losses to be better assessed before mediation.
In Parkin v Boral Limited (Class Closure) [2022] FCAFC 47, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia has unanimously held that the Court has power to order notice to be given to group members foreshadowing a class closure order at settlement.
Parkin has created a divergence between the Federal Court of Australia and Supreme Court of New South Wales. Parkin concluded that the NSW Court of Appeal’s decision in Wigmans v AMP Ltd1, which held that the class action legislative regime did not permit giving notices foreshadowing class closure orders, was plainly wrong.
In this article, we provide an overview of the Parkin decision and consider the implications for the settlement of class actions in Australia.
In Parkin, the Full Court was asked to consider two issues, only one of which is relevant for the purpose of this article.
The first was whether the Federal Court of Australia has power to approve a notice to group members giving notice that upon any settlement the lead applicant will seek an order, which, if made, has the effect of excluding unregistered group members or group members who have opted out from obtaining any benefit from any settlement.2
This issue was decided in the affirmative. Consequently, the Full Court did not consider it necessary to decide the second issue.
The Full Court observed that s 33X(5) of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) expressly empowers the Federal Court of Australia to make an order “at any stage” that notice be given to group members “of any matter.”3 The “broad and unqualified” terms of s 33X were to be approached “on the basis that Parliament said what it meant and meant what it said.”4
The Court said that there is no indication in the words of s 33X that “the power in s 33X(5) should be read down such that the Court does not have power to make an order at the opt out stage to notify group members that, if a settlement is later reached, the applicant intends to apply to the Court for an order that, if made, will mean that group members who have neither opted out nor registered will not be entitled to seek a benefit under the settlement.”5
The NSW Court of Appeal in Wigmans held that an order giving notice to group members foreshadowing an intention to seek a class closure order is beyond power. The NSW Court of Appeal said that such an order was inconsistent with the “fundamental precept” of the class action regime that group members are entitled to remain passive during class action proceedings.6
The Full Court rejected the approach of the NSW Court of Appeal and emphasised that general principles should not constrain the interpretation of legislative provisions without proper consideration of the context of the provision in the class action regime and its intended purpose.7
The Full Court drew analogies with a number of provisions within the class action regime that require group members to take an active role in proceedings.8 For example, group members may be ordered to provide discovery, provide particulars of their identity or claims, and contribute towards security for costs.9 The Full Court were of the view that these examples demonstrated that group members may be required to take active steps in the proceedings.
In Wigmans, the NSW Court of Appeal determined that orders giving notice of class closure would create a conflict between the interests of group members who had registered and those who had not.10 It is in the interests of all group members who have registered to achieve a favourable settlement, and in the interests of group members who have not registered for the proceedings not to settle regardless of the terms offered.11
The Full Court considered that the dangers of any conflict arising could be ameliorated by the court exercising its discretion to approve a settlement under s 33V of the Act. Accordingly, the Full Court considered that conflicts of interest between group members should not be an impediment to the court exercising its power to permit the giving of notice to group members foreshadowing an intention to seek a class closure order.12
The Full Court granted the order permitting the giving of notice to group members foreshadowing an intention to seek a class closure order. Consequently, the Full Court said that it was not necessary to decide whether a class closure order could be made prior to a settlement.
The NSW Court of Appeal in Haselhurst v Toyota13 decided that an order which excludes unregistered group members from receiving a portion of the settlement sum and extinguishes their claims cannot be made under the New South Wales equivalent of s 33ZF of the Act. Our article on the Haselhurst decision is available here.
The Full Court considered that the orders sought in Parkin and Haselhurst were sufficiently different that the decision of Haselhurst was distinguishable.14 Parkin has thus left the door open for class closure orders to be made in the Federal Court if they are drafted in a manner that is sufficiently different from the orders considered in Haselhurst.
Parkin is authority for courts administering class action regimes to make orders permitting the giving of notice to group members foreshadowing an intention to seek a class closure order to exclude unregistered group members from benefiting from a settlement.
These types of orders will appeal to both applicants and respondents. Class closure orders which incentivise registration of group members are likely to facilitate settlement by:
The divergence in the class action case law is likely to lead to forum shopping by applicants and litigation funders.
Following the High Court of Australia’s decision in Brewster,15 which held that the class action regime did not permit the making of common fund orders prior to settlement, and the legislative amendments in Victoria that permit contingency fees in class actions,16 litigation funders and plaintiff law firms have been incentivised to commence class actions in the Supreme Court of Victoria.
Wigmans, Haselhurst and the limits on contingency fee arrangements have seen a move away from class actions in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The availability of class closure orders in the Federal Court may be a catalyst for a move back towards the Federal Court as the forum of choice for class actions.
The divergence in authority between the Federal Court and the NSW Court of Appeal is likely to lead to the High Court resolving the conflicting approaches. An appeal to the High Court in Parkin is unlikely given the parties were agreed that the orders sought should be made.
The table below provides an overview of the kinds of “class closure” orders that have been made by the courts.
Type of order | Availability |
Notice orders: Orders that provide notice to group members of an intention to seek an order closing the class in the future | Yes: Parkin. |
“Soft closure orders”: These types of orders have the effect of setting a date for registration and excluding those group members from benefiting from the settlement sum if they have not registered by the stipulated date. The claims of unregistered group members are otherwise not extinguished if settlement is not reached. |
No: Haselhurst v Toyota. Parkin avoided the operation of Haselhurst on the basis that the orders sought in Parkin did not bar or extinguish the claims of unregistered group members (if settlement were to be reached). |
“Hard Closure Orders”: These types of orders have the effect of excluding unregistered group members from benefiting from any settlement, and extinguish the claims of group members regardless of whether or not settlement is reached. | Unlikely: Melbourne City Investments Pty Ltd v Treasury Wine Estates Limited [2017] FCAFC 98, [76] and Gill v Ethicon Sàrl (No 2) [2019] FCA 177; 134 ACSR 649, [8]-[9]. |
Parkin v Boral Limited (Class Closure) [2022] FCAFC 47, [5].
Parkin v Boral Limited (Class Closure) [2022] FCAFC 47, [114]; see also [111]-[113].
Parkin v Boral Limited (Class Closure) [2022] FCAFC 47, [111].
Parkin v Boral Limited (Class Closure) [2022] FCAFC 47, [112].
Parkin v Boral Limited (Class Closure) [2022] FCAFC 47, [115].
Parkin v Boral Limited (Class Closure) [2022] FCAFC 47, [117].
Parkin v Boral Limited (Class Closure) [2022] FCAFC 47, [118]-[124].
Parkin v Boral Limited (Class Closure) [2022] FCAFC 47, [124].
Parkin v Boral Limited (Class Closure) [2022] FCAFC 47, [126].
Haselhurst v Toyota [2020] NSWCA 66; 101 NSWLR 890, [120].
Parkin v Boral Limited (Class Closure) [2022] FCAFC 47, [133].
[2020] NSWCA 66; 101 NSWLR 890.
Parkin v Boral Limited (Class Closure) [2022] FCAFC 47, [100].
BMW Australia Ltd v Brewster [2019] HCA 45; 269 CLR 574.
See the Justice Legislation Miscellaneous Amendments Act 2020 (Vic).
Publication
Norton Rose Fulbright has released its 2025 Annual Litigation Trends Survey, analyzing litigation trends across the legal landscape.
Publication
In late December 2024, the Ontario Court of Appeal clarified the applicable test for leave to appeal from the province’s Divisional Court, which the Court of Appeal had only recently discussed at length earlier that month.
Subscribe and stay up to date with the latest legal news, information and events . . .
© Norton Rose Fulbright LLP 2025