Introduction
This article examines recent Asian developments in legalization of third party funding
and contrasts these with the approach in England and Wales where the market is more
established. It also looks at the emergence of portfolio funding and how that may
impact on disclosure of conflicts of interest in London seated arbitrations.
Recent Asian developments in legalization of third party funding
In England and Wales, the passing of
the Criminal Law Act 1967 formally
eliminated the archaic legal bars of
maintenance and champerty to third
party funding in England, which
paved the way for the development of
the funding industry in the London
arbitration market. Since this time,
the approach to third party funding in
arbitration has been a combination of an
ad hoc, market- and case law-driven one.
Nowadays the industry is predominantly
self-regulating, with some funders
volunteering to be members of the
Association of Litigation Funders
which sets out for its members certain
minimum requirements for third party
funding. A substantial proportion of the
market, however, is unregulated.
The arbitral hubs of Singapore and
Hong Kong have recently followed the
English approach by abolishing the
traditional doctrines of maintenance and
champerty for third party funding in
arbitration. By contrast to England,
however, these jurisdictions have also
introduced laws which provide for
oversight of the industry.
In February 2019, Hong Kong
implemented legislative amendments
to provide for the legality of third
party funding of Hong Kong seated
arbitrations. The amendments will
require third party funders to submit to Hong Kong’s Code of Practice for Third Party Funding in Arbitration which prescribes inter alia capital adequacy requirements; processes and procedures
required for identifying and disclosing
conflicts of interest; and terms that must
be included in the funding agreement
regarding termination, control and
liability for costs, including adverse
costs. Notably, there is an advisory body
overseeing the compliance with the
Hong Kong Code. This can be contrasted
with the position of the litigation funders
in England who voluntarily elect to
membership of the self-regulating
Association of Litigation Funders.
Another important point to consider
when examining the new Hong Kong
Code is the requirement of systematic
disclosure of the participation of a
third party funder. This is in contrast to
England and Wales where disclosure is
a voluntary process, moderated only by
the tribunals’ power to order disclosure.
The Hong Kong developments followed
shortly after similar amendments in
Singapore which has also now opened
up to third party funding of arbitrations
seated in the jurisdiction. The introduction
of new laws in Singapore included
a comprehensive suite of legislation
addressing issues ranging from minimum
eligibility requirements of paid-up
share capital for third party funders to
counsels’ duties in respect of disclosure
of the existence of a third party funding
agreement. Interestingly, the latter strikes a
different position to the one in Hong Kong,
where the duty to disclose is imposed on
the parties themselves.
These moves by Singapore and Hong
Kong come at an important time with the
roll out of the Belt and Road Initiative by
China. This ambitious cross-border
infrastructure project will no doubt
generate disputes and Hong Kong and
Singapore are seeking to position
themselves as leading jurisdictions for
the resolution of such disputes.
Third party portfolio funding
The recent decision of Snowden J in
Davey v Money [2019] EWHC 997 (Ch)
has rocked the English litigation funding
market, eroding the certainty the Arkin
cap (where a funder’s liability for
adverse costs was limited to the amount
of funding provided to the Claimant)
had provided as to the exposure of
litigation funders to adverse cost orders in English litigation. These changes,
although significant, have had a limited
impact on the third party funding market
for arbitration – third party funders
are neither party to the arbitration
agreement nor the arbitral proceedings
and so are not subject to the tribunal’s
jurisdiction, and risk for adverse costs
awards is therefore a matter for the
funding agreement.
In the arbitration space, however, the
general trend of increasing costs of
initiating and running international
commercial and investment treaty
arbitration has led to an increase in
the number of funded cases. With the
growth of the industry, third party
funding options are increasingly creative
as the market seeks to expand beyond
impecunious claimants to sophisticated
commercial clients who are willing to
pay the costs of third party funding
in return for spreading their legal risk
and move arbitration expenses off their
balance sheet.
One interesting trend is the development
of portfolio funding, where funders
provide a monetary package which can
be deployed across multiple matters.
According to Burford Capital’s 2018
Litigation Financing Annual Report, over
half of its committed capital was
deployed under portfolio arrangements rather than funding on a matter by
matter basis.
Portfolio funding generally operates
in two ways
- Multiple disputes of a single party
with various risk profiles are
packaged together and funding is
provided across all the matters on a
cross-collateralization basis. For the
most part, these will be claims but
there is the potential to fund the costs
of defending cases within a portfolio
arrangement. Third party funders
promote this type of financing as
benefiting corporate entities due to
the differing accounting treatment of
legal costs and debts when supported
by a third party funder.
- The funder directly contracts with a
law firm, providing funding of matters
it is pursuing on a conditional fee
arrangement basis. This latter type
is also known as law firm financing.
Third party funders promote this type
of funding as beneficial to firms which
are unable to take on high-risk but
also high-value work.
Portfolio funding gives rise to additional
conflict of interest challenges. The ICCA QMUL Report into Third Party Financing
identified a gap in the IBA Guidelines
on Conflicts of Interest in International
Arbitration as conflicts of interest are
framed in terms of direct and indirect
economic interests in the outcome of
arbitrations. The cross-collateralization
of claims means that the economic
interest is spread across the portfolio as
a whole and is not tied directly to the
outcome of one claim which ultimately
fails to capture portfolio funding and law
firm financing.
Potentially, the conflict of interest
concerns would be mitigated by
systematic disclosure where a claim
is funded. Opponents to systematic
disclosure argue, however, that there
can be procedural and strategic impacts
flowing from disclosure of funding,
such as where respondents drive up
the costs of the case through frivolous
applications and challenges, prolonging
the arbitration. It is not clear how
substantial such risks are. However,
these considerations would have to be
assessed against the risks to enforcement
and challenge of arbitral awards
where an undisclosed conflict surfaces
following the issuance of an award.
One thing is certain though, with
third party funding available now in
Singapore and Hong Kong, the global
market will only continue to grow and
as funding becomes more prevalent its
use, and the demands of the market, will
evolve. This is an interesting time for the
funding market.
The authors would like to thank
Will McCaughan for his assistance
with this article.
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