Introduction
Data protection and cyber security are hot topics in international arbitration. A majority
of respondents in the 2018 Queen Mary International Arbitration Survey listed “security
of electronic communications and information” as an issue which should be addressed
in arbitration rules. This demonstrates that users of arbitration are concerned about
data security.
While there are signs that the market
is listening, users seem to think that
institutions, counsel and tribunals could
do more to address cybersecurity.
This article examines three areas of
data protection and cyber security in
arbitration
- The European Union’s General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
and how it bears on international
arbitration.
- Data breaches in arbitral proceedings
and cyberattacks on institutions, and
how institutions are responding
- How hacked evidence might appear in
arbitration, and how tribunals have
dealt with this issue.
GDPR and arbitration
The GDPR has significantly altered the
landscape of data protection. Its broad
scope and potentially severe penalties
have forced those who hold and process
data to take note of its provisions. The
international arbitration community
must be aware of the terms of the GDPR
and how it impacts the arbitral process.
The GDPR applies to “personal data”.
This concept is defined extremely
broadly to include any information
relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person, and would include
things such as an individual’s name,
address and any online identifier (such
as an email address). The GDPR also has
a broad scope of application, reaching
entities in the EU as well as entities
outside the EU processing data of EU based individuals in some contexts. For
example, a witness based in the EU may
in some circumstances import GDPR
obligations into an arbitration, even if
the arbitration is otherwise completely
independent of the EU.
This wide scope of application is coupled
with potentially severe penalties of
up to €20 million or 4 per cent of an entity’s
total worldwide annual turnover of the
preceding financial year (whichever is
higher) for certain contraventions of the
GDPR. It is important to note that these
penalties can be imposed per breach –
meaning that penalties potentially could
quickly reach a significant level.
If the GDPR is engaged, entities which
process personal data will be subject
to a number of obligations. If an entity
is deemed to be a data controller
for the purposes of the GDPR, these
obligations would include the need to
identify a lawful basis to process data,
a requirement to ensure appropriate
technical and organizational measures
are in place in order to safeguard the
security of processing (including to
prevent data breaches to the extent
possible), and a requirement that data is
not transferred outside the EU other than
in certain specified circumstances. If an
entity is deemed to be a data processor
rather than a controller, the GDPR
contains detailed provisions as to how
the processor should only process data
on the basis of documented instructions
from the controller.
The detail of how the GDPR operates is
complex. The key point for international
arbitration practitioners is to be aware
that the GDPR may be relevant to their
arbitration, regardless of whether they are,
or the arbitration is seated, in Europe.
Cyber-attacks and institutional responses
In July 2015, the website of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)
was hacked in the midst of an ongoing
maritime border dispute between China
and the Philippines. Malware was implanted on the PCA’s website which
infected the computers of visitors,
potentially exposing them to data theft.
The attack on the PCA illustrates the risk
faced by arbitral institutions. Parties in
arbitration can be called upon to
disclose sensitive material to prove their
case. While in many jurisdictions, it is
assumed that the arbitration will be
cloaked in confidentiality, cyber-attacks
have the potential to seriously
undermine the confidentiality of the
arbitral process.
The arbitral community is responding to
this risk. The most prominent example
is the draft Cybersecurity Protocol for
International Arbitration published
by the ICCA, the New York City Bar
Association and the CPR Institute last
year. The Protocol is intended to apply
in particular cases, either by agreement
of the parties or order of the tribunal.
Once adopted, the Protocol gives the
tribunal the power to determine what
security measures are reasonable
for the case, taking into account the
views of the parties. Such measures
should account for, among other
things, the transmission of materials,
communication between arbitrators,
storage of information and security of data. Importantly, the Protocol makes
clear that cybersecurity is the shared
responsibility of all participants in
the arbitration, who must ensure all
personnel involved in the arbitration are
aware of, and follow, any cybersecurity
measures adopted.
ICCA and the IBA have also established
a Joint Task Force on Data Protection in
International Arbitration with the view
to producing a guide providing practical
guidance on the potential impact of data
protection principles, including the GDPR.
At an institutional level, arbitral
institutions are also addressing the
risk posed by cyberattacks. The Hong
Kong International Arbitration Centre
(HKIAC) Rules which entered force on 1
November 2018 specifically include as
a recognized means of communications
“any secured online repository that the
parties have agreed to use”. The London
Court of International Arbitration
(LCIA) is also aiming to revise its 2014
Arbitration Rules this year, and is
considering adding new provisions on
data protection and cybersecurity.
Data protection is an area ripe for reform
in the arbitration context and users
expect arbitral institutions to be at the
centre of the effort.
Hacked evidence in arbitration
A related issue which is appearing more
regularly in arbitration is the attempted
use of evidence obtained through
cyberattacks or data breaches. This issue
has arisen most predominantly in
investment arbitration. For example, in
both the Yukos disputes and ConocoPhilips
v Venezuela the parties sought to rely on
evidence obtained from WikiLeaks.
Arbitration rules typically afford broad
discretion to the tribunal to decide
evidentiary issues. For example,
Article 27(4) of the UNCITRAL Rules
provides that the “arbitral tribunal
shall determine the admissibility,
relevance, materiality and weight of the
evidence offered”. Article 9(2) of the
IBA Rules of on the Taking of Evidence
in International Arbitrations permits
the tribunal to exclude evidence on
grounds of either “legal impediment or
privilege under … legal or ethical rules”
or “special political or institutional
sensitivity”.
In ConocoPhilips, the tribunal was
asked to reopen its earlier decision
on jurisdiction in light of information
contained in hacked emails published
by WikiLeaks. The majority did not
expressly address whether that evidence
was admissible, finding instead that
it simply did not have the power to
reopen its earlier findings. A dissenting
opinion in that case relied on the emails’
contents as a basis for reopening the
decision, without expressly addressing
whether the emails were admissible in
the first place. However, in Caratube
International v Kazakhstan, the tribunal
expressly admitted emails which had
been published on WikiLeaks to the
extent such material was not covered by
legal professional privilege.
Given the paucity of authority, there is
little evidence as yet that a consistent
approach to dealing with these issues is
emerging. As data breaches become
more common, tribunals will be called
on more frequently to rule on the
admissibility of such evidence. It is
hoped that as tribunals engage with this
issue, some guidance will be available to
parties as to how it might be dealt with.
Conclusion
Data protection and cyber risk are
emerging as an important considerations
in arbitration. The arbitral community,
and the arbitral institutions, are taking
steps to address this concern, but more
needs to be done. As these issues are
experienced more frequently, it is to
be hoped that consistent practices will
emerge, which will offer users comfort
that their data will be secure.
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