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L’IA générative
L’intelligence artificielle (IA) soulève de nombreuses questions en matière de propriété intellectuelle (PI).
Australie | Publication | February 13, 2020
“Always was, always will be”. This traditional protest call, the theme of NAIDOC week for 2020, ordinarily relates to the idea of indigenous connection to land, and is at the core of native title preceding and co-existing with common law sovereignty. But can this statement also be applied to the idea of being Aboriginal Australian? In Love v Commonwealth and Thoms v Commonwealth, the High Court considered the intersection between being Aboriginal Australian and that of ‘alien’ within the meaning of section 51(xix) of the Constitution.1
By a majority of 4 to 3, the Court decided that Aboriginal Australians who are born overseas and are not citizens of Australia are nevertheless not within the reach of the ‘aliens’ power in s 51(xix) of the Constitution.
The Plaintiffs, Daniel Love and Brendan Thoms, were both born overseas with one Aboriginal Australian parent and both identify as Aboriginal Australian. Both Plaintiffs had been recognised as members of an Aboriginal community. However, neither Mr Love nor Mr Thoms sought to become Australian citizens.
The Commonwealth sought to deport both Plaintiffs pursuant to s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), on the basis that both were serving a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more. The Commonwealth argued that, since the Plaintiffs were not citizens, they were necessarily aliens, and therefore the Commonwealth had the jurisdiction to deport the Plaintiffs pursuant to s 51(xix) of the Constitution.
The majority, Bell, Nettle, Gordon and Edelman JJ, held that persons in the Plaintiffs’ position were not within the reach of s 51(xix) for the following reasons:
The minority, Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Keane JJ disagreed that the Plaintiffs were not within the scope of s 51(xix). Their Honours held that:
Despite providing separate reasons, the majority judges provided a clear consensus by authorising Bell J to state that “Aboriginal Australians (understood according to the tripartite test in Mabo [No 2]) are not within the reach of the "aliens" power conferred by s 51(xix) of the Constitution”.15
The majority held that determination of whether the Plaintiffs were Aboriginal was a question of fact, requiring a claim of Aboriginal descent, identity as a member of an Aboriginal community and a recognition of that claim by the Aboriginal community. On the facts, Nettle J found that Mr Thoms was a recognised member of an Aboriginal community because his status as a native title holder was undisputed. However, his Honour found that the facts were unclear in respect of Mr Love, and remitted the question of his status to the Federal Court.16
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Cth) (the Constitution).
(1992) 175 CLR 1 (‘Mabo [No 2]’); Love v Commonwealth; Thoms v Commonwealth [2020] HCA 3 at [71], [268], [289], [298], [350], [373], [451] (‘Love v Commonwealth’).
Love v Commonwealth [2020] HCA 3 at (per Bell J at [70]-[74], Nettle J at [262], [268]-[272], Gordon J at [333], [335], [357], [368] and Edelman J at [447], [452], [454], [466]).
Love v Commonwealth [2020] HCA 3 at [394].
Love v Commonwealth [2020] HCA 3 at [295], [304].
Love v Commonwealth [2020] HCA 3 at [394], [396], [437].
Love v Commonwealth [2020] HCA 3 at [66], [373], [435], [444].
Love v Commonwealth [2020] HCA 3 at [71], [270], [272], [454].
Love v Commonwealth [2020] HCA 3 at [31], [44], [126], [133], [147], [178], [181].
Love v Commonwealth [2020] HCA 3 at [29], [127], [193]-[195].
Love v Commonwealth [2020] HCA 3 at [29], [127], [193]-[195].
Love v Commonwealth [2020] HCA 3 at [25], [137], [196].
Love v Commonwealth [2020] HCA 3 at [181].
Love v Commonwealth [2020] HCA 3 at [126].
Love v Commonwealth [2020] HCA 3 at [81].
Love v Commonwealth [2020] HCA 3 at [287]-[288].
Publication
L’intelligence artificielle (IA) soulève de nombreuses questions en matière de propriété intellectuelle (PI).
Publication
Depuis 2022, le gouvernement du Canada a apporté trois vagues de modifications à la Loi sur la concurrence (Loi), apportant des modifications importantes aux lois canadiennes sur la concurrence, les plus récentes modifications ayant reçu la sanction royale le 20 juin 2024. Notre publication sur toutes les modifications se trouve ici.
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Les systèmes d’IA générative sont entraînés au moyen de gros volumes de données, souvent tirées de sources du domaine public qui peuvent être protégées par le droit d’auteur ou d’autres droits de propriété intellectuelle, comme un droit sur les bases de données au Royaume-Uni et dans l’UE.
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